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Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recover for the
Loss of a Chance of Survival
Traditionally, a plaintiff suffering from misdiagnosis has been precluded
from recovery unless he could show that "but for" the misdiagnosis he would
have had a better-than-even chance of recovery. While many courts have at-
tempted to avoid this doctrine by reducing the standard of causation, this has
led to inconsistent results. The better approach is to recognize that a "chance"
of recovery has a compensable value in and of itself This comment will ex-
plore the concept of loss of a chance and trace its development as it relates to
medical malpractice actions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to increasing public awareness of the importance of health and
early detection of various disease entities such as cancer, cardiovascu-
lar disease, and diabetes, medical malpractice suits alleging misdiag-
nosis and treatment are drastically on the rise. The majority of
jurisdictions in the United States continue to cling to the traditional
"but for" test of causation. This test denies an aggrieved patient the
right to recover from a physician who has negligently deprived him
of a chance to recover or survive unless the patient can prove that he
had a better-than-even chance of recovery in the absence of the phy-
sician's negligence.1
Consider, for example, a patient who presents himself to a doctor,
complaining of a persistent cough. If the physician negligently fails
to diagnose the patient's lung cancer at this time, the physician has
increased the probability that the cancer will spread, thereby de-
creasing the patient's probability of recovery and survival. However,
even if the physician discovers the lung tumor at this time, the pa-
tient would still have only a forty percent chance of complete recov-
ery and survival. Under the majority approach, this loss of a less-
than-even chance of recovery would not be compensable, since re-
gardless of the physician's negligence, the patient more likely than
not will die anyway.
Due to a fairly new concept regarding the right to recover for the
loss of a chance to survive, a recent trend has developed which allows
1. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1365 (1981). This
majority rule applies to all types of personal injury cases.
a patient to recover from a physician who has in essence caused a loss
or lessening of his chance to survive. Although the cases allowing re-
covery by these types of patients have the same policy considerations
in mind, inconsistencies exist among the various jurisdictions in their
treatments of the causative standard of proof. Commentators believe
that these inconsistencies arise from the courts' failure to focus on
the key issue-namely, where one is deprived of his chance to sur-
vive, the actual loss suffered is this lost chance, not the life itself.2
Courts which are hesitant to abandon the traditional "but for" or
"more probable than not" causation standards need not continue to
refuse to recognize this cause of action. It is not suggested that the
courts abandon causation--only that they look at what the actual
damage is.
With the emphasis properly placed on actual loss, it follows that li-
ability should be imposed on physicians who negligently fail to diag-
nose and treat promptly and properly, thus affording an aggrieved
patient a just compensation for the loss of a chance to survive. Fail-
ure to recognize this right to recover allows physicians to evade re-
sponsibility for their negligent acts or omissions, 3 thereby negating
the whole purpose of tort law.
The concept of a right to recover for the loss of a chance for sur-
vival in a medical malpractice situation has its origins in both Ameri-
can and Commonwealth case law establishing the right of
compensation for the loss of a chance in various types of non-medical
situations. These cases will be explored and the various approaches
which the courts have taken on the causation issue will be discussed
and analyzed. Finally, the complex task of valuing such a lost chance
will be discussed.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF RECOVERY FOR THE Loss OF
A CHANCE
The concept of compensating one for his loss of a chance has its or-
igins in the early English case of Chaplin v. Hicks.4 In haplin, the
plaintiff entered into a contract entitling her to a chance to become
one of twelve finalists out of fifty semifinalists in a beauty pageant
who would receive three-year acting engagements. 5 The plaintiff did
2. See Note, Damages Contingent Upon Chance, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 875, 875
(1964).
3. See Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages for the Loss of a Chance,
1978 PERs. INJ. ANN. 744, 744.
4. [1911] 2 K.B. 786.
For a general discussion of the development of the "loss of a chance" theory in Eng-
lish jurisdictions, see 9 H. McGREGOR, McGREGOR ON DAMAGES 266-71 (13th ed.
1972); Cooper, Assessing Possibilities in Damage Awards-The Loss of a Chance or the
Chance of a Loss, 37 SASK. L. REV. 193, 197-209 (1973).
5. Originally, there had been about 6,000 contestants. [1911] 2 K.B. at 787.
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not appear for her personal interview due to the defendant's failure
to inform her of the time of the interview. As a result, twelve other
contestants were chosen for the acting positions.
Because the plaintiff would have had one chance in four of winning
in the absence of the defendant's breach, the court upheld a recovery
of £100 to the plaintiff. In response to the defendant's argument that
the damages were impossible to assess, the court stated that mere dif-
ficulty in assessing damages was no bar to a plaintiff's right to re-
cover.6 Furthermore, the defendant's contention that damages for the
loss of a potential benefit were not recoverable was negated by the
court's treatment of the plaintiff's loss as the loss of a chance to win a
prize, rather than a loss of the prize itself.7 Thus, this case estab-
lished firm precedent for the proposition that a chance has value and
is compensable.8
Subsequent English cases have adhered to the reasoning in Chap-
lin, allowing recovery for damages commensurate with the
probability that the chance would have occurred.9 Such cases have
led to the development of what is now known as the "simple
probability" approach of calculating damages. This theory involves
the reduction of the probability (or chance) to a numerical value and
the multiplication of that value by the economic value of the possible
future benefit to the plaintiff.10 In applying this theory, the English
courts have also been able to deal with the problem of assessing the
effect of various contingencies upon the probability of the alleged
chance."'
6. Id. at 795. The court stated that where an actual loss has resulted from the
breach of a contract, and the value of such a loss is difficult to determine, it is the
jury's function to do its best to estimate the damages to be awarded. Id.
7. In depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity of competing with the other con-
testants, the defendant also deprived her of a valuable right. Id at 791, 793.
8. Note, supra note 2, at 879.
9. See Domine v. Grimsdall, [1937] 2 All E.R. 119 (plaintiff allowed to recover £15
for the loss of the chance of payment on a debt when a bailiff breached his duty in
carrying out an ordered execution); Otter v. Church, Adams, Tatham & Co., [1953] 1
Ch. 280 (administratrix of son's estate allowed to recover damages from a negligent so-
licitor who failed to advise her decedent son to execute a disentailing assurance or will,
thereby depriving the decedent of the opportunity of increasing the value of his
estate).
10. Note, supra note 2, at 880.
11. See, e.g., Hall v. Meyrick, [1957] 2 Q.B. 455, rev'd on other grounds, [1957] 2
Q.B. 472, in which defendant solicitor failed to inform plaintiff that her subsequent
marriage would revoke the couple's chance to benefit under their mutual wills, which
were not made in contemplation of their marriage. Upon her husband's death, plain-
tiff was made aware of the revoked status of the mutual wills secondary to their mar-
riage. In a negligence action against the defendant to recover the value of her
The reasoning in Chaplin has been followed in a number of Ameri-
can contract cases.12 In these cases, the damages have been held to
be special damages. Thus, the defendant would only be liable for
such damages if he had, or should have had, knowledge that such
damages might reasonably be anticipated as a result of his breach.13
As in Chaplin, the courts which have allowed recovery have held
that recovery should not be denied due to the difficulty in ascertain-
ing the actual amount.1 4 As one court stated, estimation of damages
in such cases "'necessarily requires some improvisation, and the
party who has caused the loss may not insist on theoretical
perfection.' "15
However, a major obstacle to recovery for the value of a lost
chance remains in the American majority "all-or-nothing" approach,
which denies recovery unless damages can be ascertained with cer-
tainty.16 Although the standard of "certainty" has been gradually re-
laxed to "reasonable certainty" and to "reasonable probability," the
husband's estate, the court stated that in order to fully recover, the plaintiff needed to
show that she would have remembered a given warning regarding the revoking effect
of the marriage, that her husband would have been willing to make a new will subse-
quent to their marriage, that this new will would have been wholly in her favor, and
that such will would not have been subsequently revoked. Id. at 470. The court held
that "[t]he more the contingencies, the lower the value of the chance or opportunity of
which the plaintiff was deprived." Id at 471. The judge, in making allowance for the
various contingencies involved, awarded plaintiff one-third of what she would have re-
ceived if she had not gotten married. Id at 468, 472.
12. See, e.g., Wachtel v. National Alfalfa Journal Co., 190 Iowa 1293, 176 N.W. 801
(1920) (contestant in a magazine contest offering valuable prizes allowed to recover
damages for the value of the right to compete when the contest was discontinued in
her district); Hall v. Nassau Consumers' Ice Co., 260 N.Y. 417, 183 N.E. 903 (1933)
(plaintiff allowed to recover for the loss of a chance to win $5,000.00 in a lottery when
the defendant failed to make any drawing whatsoever); Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. Co.
v. Bell, 197 S.W. 322, 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (in action for damages due to the delay
in a shipment of hogs for exhibition at a stock show, Texas court held that the plaintiff
could recover for the loss of his chance in winning prize money, although damages
could not be based upon the amount of the lost prize).
13. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 [1854].
14. See Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 926 (2d
Cir. 1977). In Contemporary Mission, the court held that the plaintiffs introduction of
a statistical analysis to prove how successful its recordings would have been if defend-
ant had not breached his promoting contract was not too speculative. Id. at 926-27.
15. Id. at 926 (quoting Entis v. Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F.2d 759, 763 (2d
Cir. 1964)). Cf. 11 S. WILusToN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1346, at 243-
45 (3d ed. 1968) (acknowledging that a plaintiff should not be deprived of compensa-
tion merely because the amount of damages is uncertain). However, Williston cautions
that where the chance of which a plaintiff is deprived has a value in a business sense
(e.g., anticipated profits), the courts are reluctant to allow recovery of substantial dam-
ages. Id, at 245. See also Note, Speculative Profits as Damages for Breach of Contract,
46 HARv. L. REv. 696, 698-99 (1933).
16. See Cooper, supra note 4, at 209-15; Note, supra note 2, at 885-92. This rule of
certainty of damages was developed to prevent conjectural, speculative, or remote jury
awards. See C. McCORMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 25 at 97-99 (1935).
See also Note, supra note 2, at 885 (another reason the American courts use this rule is
because it is easy to apply).
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majority of American courts still require recovery to be based upon a
showing that "more probably than not" (or something stronger than
fifty-fifty) 17 the result would have been favorable absent the defend-
ant's negligence. This harsh "all-or-nothing" approach has been
widely criticized as "result[ing] in oscillation between overlavishness
and niggardliness."s
In Pollack v. Pollack, 19 the "all-or-nothing" approach resulted in an
"overlavish" award. In that case, the defendant promised to pay the
plaintiff $5,000.00 annually for the rest of the plaintiff's life, with the
condition that if the plaintiff predeceased him, all obligations on the
defendant's part would cease. If, however, the defendant predeceased
the plaintiff, he would devise $100,000.00 to the plaintiff.
When the defendant breached his annual payments, the plaintiff
sued him for the full value of the contract. Through the use of actua-
rial tables, the court determined that the plaintiff's life expectancy
was 14.74 years and that of the defendant's was 11.67 years. Because
it was more probable than not that the defendant would predecease
the plaintiff, the court awarded the plaintiff $5,000.00 for the next
11.67 years and $100,000.00 for the will.20 Thus, the court failed to
even consider the possibility that the plaintiff might predecease the
defendant; rather, it treated the plaintiff's survival as a certainty.21
On the other hand, the "niggardliness" of the "all-or-nothing" ap-
proach is illustrated by Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hall.22 In
Hall, the plaintiff sent his broker a telegram instructing him to
purchase 10,000 barrels of oil at $1.17 per barrel. Because the defend-
ant failed to deliver the telegram, the plaintiff lost his chance for
profit when the price rose to $1.35 per barrel the following morning.
However, since the plaintiff could not prove by a certainty that he
would, in fact, have sold the oil at that price, the court refused to al-
low him recovery.
17. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 31, at 118.
18. Id. § 31, at 119.
19. 39 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1931).
20. Id. at 858.
21. Had the court used the English "simple probability" approach, the court would
have scaled down plaintiff's award according to the degree of probability that he would
predecease the defendant-a much fairer result in light of the uncertainty involved.
22. 124 U.S. 444 (1888). See also Collatz v. Fox Wis. Amusement Corp., 239 Wis.
156, 300 N.W. 162 (1941), in which the plaintiff, one of two final contestants in a ques-
tion-answer contest for an automobile, was wrongly eliminated from the contest. The
court held that because the plaintiff could not prove that he would have won, defend-
ant was entitled to give the automobile to whomever he wished. Id. This case is the
antithesis of the English case, Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786.
The major finding of the "all-or-nothing" method when applied to
tort law is that it does not allow an award of damages in proportion
to the probabilities even though the requirements of duty, breach,
and causation have been shown to a certainty. This approach has
been criticized on several grounds. First, and most obvious, the "all-
or-nothing" approach is arbitrary.23 Second, this approach "subverts
the deterrence objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the ef-
fects of conduct that causes statistically demonstrable losses." 24
Third, it pressures courts into mitigating the inherent harshness of
the "all-or-nothing" rule by distorting and changing other rules af-
fecting causation and damages. 25 Fourth, this approach gives culpa-
ble defendants the benefit of the uncertainty created by their own
tortious conduct.2 6 Finally, it denies that the loss of a less-than-even
chance is worthy of redress. 27
A further problem in this area lies in the difficulty American
courts seem to have had in conceptualizing the relationship between
causation and damage where the damage is the loss of a chance. In
order to better understand why American courts have been unable or
unwilling to recognize a plaintiff's claim for the loss of a chance, fo-
cusing exclusively instead on death or debilitation as the only com-
pensable damage, the issue of causation must be analyzed.
III. THE CAUSATION ISSUE
It is a fundamental principle in the law of torts in both American 28
and Commonwealth 29 jurisdictions that causation is a necessary ele-
ment of proof before an injured plaintiff can recover damages from a
negligent defendant. In a medical malpractice action for personal in-
juries or wrongful death, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
23. King, supra note 1, at 1376. This arbitrariness can be equated to McCormick's
concept of "oscillation between overlavishness and niggardliness." MCCORMICK, supra
note 16, § 31, at 119.
24. King, supra note 1, at 1377. "A failure to allocate the cost of these losses to
their tortious sources undermines the whole range of functions served by the causa-
tion-valuation process and strikes at the integrity of the torts system of loss alloca-
tion." Id,
25. Id, at 1377-78. For example, the court might feel compelled to relax the stan-
dard of proof required for causation as represented by the application of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 323(a) (1965) or the application of the substantial factor test. See
infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
26. King, supra note 1, at 1378. "But for the defendant's tortious conduct, it would
not have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of chance." Id,
27. Id at 1378. Chance inherently has value. Certainly there is a "qualitative dif-
ference between a condition that affords a chance of recovery and one that offers no
chance at all .... I Id,
28. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 30, 165 (5th ed. 1984).
29. See W. MEREDITH, MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 'OF DOcTORs AND HOsPITALS 85-86
(1956); L. ROZOVSKY, CANADIAN HosPrrAL LAw 47 (1974). See also generally A. LIN-
DEN, CANADIAN NEGLIGENCE LAw (1972).
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physician's conduct was negligent and that such negligence caused 30
the injuries or death before any evidence of the loss of a chance can
be submitted to the jury.31
A. Cases Which Have Denied Recovery for the Loss of a Chance of
Survival
An early medical malpractice case, Kuhn v. Banker,32 illustrates
the majority rule that causation of an injury must be proven with
"reasonable certainty" or "reasonable probability."33 A patient sued
her physician for alleged malpractice in treating her broken hip, re-
sulting in a fifty to seventy-five percent occupational disability. Be-
cause she failed to show that the subsequent disunion of the healing
bone was caused by the physician's negligence, she was unable to re-
cover damages. The court stated that "'[i]t is legally and logically im-
possible for it to be probable that a fact exists, and at the same time
probable that it does not exist.' "34 Thus, the patient's loss of her
chance for total recovery, in and of itself, was not a sufficient injury
from which damages could flow.
This degree-of-certainty rule was clearly stated in Orcutt v. Spo-
30. Under modern tort law, a plaintiff must generally show both "proximate
cause" and "cause-in-fact" in order to recover on a negligence claim. See PROSSER,
supra note 28, at 165. It should be noted that many courts interchange these two
phrases in referring to causation in general. It will be helpful to the reader of this
article simply to think of causation generally when such phrases are used.
31. See Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 853, 364 P.2d 1102, 1105-06
(1961). It must be remembered that under the majority rule, this evidence may only
go to prove that the patient had a better-than-even chance of recovery in the absence
of the physician's negligence, not simply that a loss of a chance was sustained by the
patient. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
32. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 31, at 118. Although the following discussion in-
volves only American cases, English and Commonwealth jurisdictions also require the
same standard of proof for causation. See, e.g., Levesque v. Comeau, 1970 S.C.R 1010
(holding that causation in a negligence action must be established by a "preponderance
of the probabilities"); Davies v. Harrington, 44 N.S.R.2d 384, 401 (1981) (adopting the
Cimco burden of proof standard); Cimco Ltd. v. Starr Mfg. Ltd., 17 N.S.RI2d 381, 398
(1976) ("more probable than not" is the degree of probability required before the bur-
den of proof is met in a civil case).
33. 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242 (1938).
34. Id. at 312, 13 N.E.2d at 246 (quoting Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 490, 15
N.E. 350, 360 (1887)). It is interesting to note that in a previous Ohio case the court
stated that "any (negligent conduct] which diminishes the [plaintiff's] chances of...
recovery ... would, in a legal sense, constitute injury." Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio
St. 253, 261 (1867). The Kuhn v. Banker court, however, merely treated this language
as obiter dictum. Kuhn, 133 Ohio St. at 315, 13 N.E.2d at 246.
kane County,3 5 a Washington wrongful'death case, where the court
stated:
We have often held that in actions in which recovery is sought for physical
conditions allegedly resulting from injuries inflicted by the wrongful act of
the defendant, the plaintiff must produce evidence to establish, with reason-
able certainty, a causal relationship between the injury and the subsequent
condition, so that the jury will not be indulging in speculation and conjecture
in passing upon this issue .... Moreover, we have held this medical testimony
must at least be that the injury "probably" or "more likely than not" caused
the subsequent condition, rather than that the accident or injury "might
have," "could have," or "possibly did" cause the subsequent condition.
3 6
The Kuhn and Orcutt principles were strongly endorsed in the
leading and oft-cited medical malpractice case of Cooper v. Sisters of
Charity of Cincinnati, Inc.37 In that case, the decedent died from a
basal skull fracture, which the defendant physician failed to diagnose.
Expert testimony established the impossibility of ascertaining pre-
cisely whether proper diagnosis and medical intervention would have
prevented the death. Thus, the court denied recovery, stating that
the plaintiff must prove that such negligence, in probability, caused
the death.38 It is interesting to note that the court in this case ac-
knowledged the attractiveness of a relaxed standard of proof where
health and life are the subject of the litigation.3 9 However, the court
rejected such a relaxed standard of proof, fearing that it would be too
35. 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961) (action in which it was alleged that dece-
dent's suicide was the result of defendant's negligence in causing automobile accident).
36. Id. at 853, 364 P.2d at 1105-06. However, note that the court, in addition to say-
ing that causation must be proven with "reasonable certainty," also said that testimony
to the effect that an injury was "probably" or "more likely than not" caused by de-
fendant's negligence would be sufficient to establish causation, thus allowing a relaxa-
tion of the certainty requirement. See also Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn.
1980) (judgment for the defendant physician granted when the plaintiff failed to prove
that it was more probable than not that his wife's liver failure and resultant death
were the result of defendant's negligence in failing to disclose the risk of cancer sur-
gery to her). But see Morgenroth v. Pacific Medical Center, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521,
126 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976) (where the expert testimony that plaintiff's stroke was more
probably a complication from the internal mammary visualization procedure than a co-
incidence was held to fall short of meeting the probability standard of causation).
37. 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
38. "Probability" was defined by this court "as that which is more likely than
not." Id. at 253, 272 N.E.2d at 104. Therefore, the expert's testimony that the decedent
had maybe around a 50% chance to survive if surgery had been performed did not con-
note probability. This case was followed in Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d
774 (1980) (the plaintiff was required to show that the refusal of an "on call" emer-
gency room physician to treat his wife, who was suffering from acute hyperglycemia,
which resulted in a forty-minute delay in her treatment, was the probable, not merely
possible, cause of her death). The Hiser court held that "the mere loss of an unspeci-
fied increment of the chance for survival is, of itself, insufficient to meet the standard
of probability." Id. at 613, 617 P.2d. at 779.
39. "The strong intuitive sense of humanity tends to emotionally direct us toward
a conclusion that in an action for wrongful death an injured person should be compen-
sated for the loss of any chance for survival, regardless of its remoteness." Cooper v.
Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d at 251-52, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
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loosely applied and thus result in more injustice than justice.40
In another action against a physician for malpractice,41 the court
held that, before the patient could recover, he had to first establish
causation by medical testimony which reasonably excluded any other
possible cause, removing the question from the realm of specula-
tion.42 Again, although the court applied the traditional "more likely
than not" test, the court appeared to question its correctness: "No
medical opinion on a question of this kind is susceptible of scientific
precision and there will always be an 'iffy' element involved."43
Regardless of growing expressions of doubt, the "more probable
than not" test continues to be consistently applied by the courts. For
example, in a 1984 Florida case,44 a wrongful death action was
brought by the decedent's wife, alleging negligence of the hospital's
emergency room staff in failing to diagnose and treat her husband's
abdominal aortic aneurysm. The aneurysm subsequently ruptured
and the husband died. Although conceding that the hospital
breached its standard of care to the decedent, the court held that,
where the evidence did not show a greater-than-even chance of sur-
vival for the decedent in the absence of the hospital's negligence, the
hospital could not be held liable.45
Thus, under the majority rule, the causation issue is taken from
the jury if the plaintiff fails to introduce evidence from which the
jury may find that the physician's negligent conduct more probably
40. Id.
41. Merriman v. Toothaker, 9 Wash. App. 810, 515 P.2d 509 (1973).
42. Id. at 814, 515 P.2d at 512. Because the expert testimony in this case estab-
lished that the alleged causal relationship was "more likely than not," the court al-
lowed the evidence to be considered by the jury. See also Hanselmann v. McCardle,
275 S.C. 46, 267 S.E.2d 531 (1980) (where the plaintiff was nonsuited when he failed to
show that "but for" the defendant physician's failure to diagnose his wife's tuberculo-
sis, she would not have died).
43. Merriman, 9 Wash. App. at 815, 515 P.2d at 512.
44. Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
45. The court applied the reasoning of Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 242, 272 N.E.2d at
97. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. While acknowledging the desirabil-
ity of relaxing the causation requirement in medical malpractice actions to avoid injus-
tice and unfairness to a plaintiff who could prove only the possibility (rather than the
probability) that the negligence caused the injury, the Gooding court reiterated the
fears discussed in Cooper that a relaxed rule would be applied too loosely, resulting in
more injustice than justice. In reaching this result, the court pointed out that no other
type of malpractice defendant carries such a heightened burden of liability. Gooding,
445 So. 2d at 1020. See also PROSSER, supra note 28, at § 41 (A plaintiff must provide
evidence that the defendant's negligent conduct "more likely than not" was a substan-
tial factor in bringing about the result. If the probabilities are evenly balanced, the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict.).
than not caused the plaintiff's injuries or death. Clearly, the lan-
guage in each of these cases indicates that the major reason for deny-
ing the plaintiff a right to recover for the loss of a chance is the fear
of abandoning the traditional and familiar causation standard.
These courts have, however, misinterpreted the true issue involved
in these cases. Had the courts focused on the loss of a chance for re-
covery as the injury sustained by the patient, rather than the loss of
life or of complete recovery, the plaintiffs would have been entitled
to recover damages, since their physicians' negligence was the certain
and sole cause of their lost chances. Thus, the "but for" or "more
probable than not" test for causation would remain intact, since "but
for" the physician's failure to diagnose and treat his patient's disease
promptly and properly, the patient would not have been deprived of
the chance to survive or recover.
B. Cases Which Have Allowed Recovery for the Loss of a Chance of
Survival
1. Application of the "Rescue Doctrine"
A minority of courts have allowed a patient to recover for the loss
of a less-than-even chance of survival. These courts have allowed a
relaxed standard of proof of causation where the patient shows that
the physician's negligent conduct in any way increased the risk of
harm to the patient or deprived him of some chance of recovery.
This concept stems from the "man overboard" cases, which hold as
actionable a sailor's failure to attempt the rescue of a drowning sea-
man, despite the lack of proof of causation.
As early as 1925, Judge Learned Hand refuted the necessity of
proving causation in a seaman's drowning before allowing the issue of
liability to go to the jury. As Judge Hand stated:
There of course remains the question whether they might have also said that
the fault caused the loss. About that we agree no certain conclusion was pos-
sible. Nobody could, in the nature of things, be sure that the intestate would
have seized the rope, or, if he had not, that it would have stopped his body.
But we are not dealing with a criminal case, nor are we justified, where cer-
tainty is impossible, in insisting upon it .... [W]e think it a question about
which reasonable men might at least differ whether the intestate would not
have been saved, had it been there.
4 6
The "rescue doctrine" was approved by the United States Supreme
Court in Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc.,47 and has been fol-
46. Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 47, 49 (2d
Cir. 1925). See also Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co., 112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1940),
where the court again relaxed the causation requirement in a "rescue" case. The deci-
sion to relax the requirement was based on the dangerousness of the sea and the over-
board seaman's absolute dependence upon his fellow crewmen for rescue. Id, at 165.
47. 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
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lowed in many jurisdictions.48
The maritime case of Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc.49 has
proven to be a leading case in the development of allowing recovery
of damages for the loss of a chance for survival. In this case, a sea-
man was not reported as missing until approximately five and one-
half hours after he was last seen. Upon notification, the master of
the ship made no attempt to search for him.50 In refusing to uphold
the causation argument of the defendant, the court stated that such a
view ignored the underlying character of the master's duty:
It was less than a duty to rescue him, but it was a positive duty to make a
sincere attempt at rescue. The duty is of such nature that its omission will
contribute to cause the seaman's death. The duty arises when there is a rea-
sonable possibility of rescue. Proximate cause is tested by the same standard,
i.e., causation is proved if the master's omission destroys the reasonable possi-
bility of rescue. Therefore, proximate cause here is implicit in the breach of
duty. Indeed, the duty would be empty if it did not itself embrace the loss as a
consequence of its breach. Once the evidence sustains the reasonable possibil-
ity of rescue, ample or narrow, according to the circumstances, total disregard
of the duty, refusal to make even a try. . . imposes liability.
Moreover, the master's default. . . obliterated all possibility of evidence to
prove whether a search, if undertaken, would have succeeded or failed. This
alone has in analogous situations been considered a sufficient ground to fasten
responsibility on the wrongdoer. 5 1
Thus, the court put the burden of proof on the master of the ship,
rather than on the helpless seaman in the water. 52
48. For a list of the various district courts which have applied the "rescue doc-
trine," see Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284, 286 n.1 (4th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963). Cases in which the circuit courts have followed this
doctrine include: Barrios v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 290 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1961); Smith v.
Reinauer Oil Transp., Inc., 256 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1958); Miller v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 247
F.2d 503 (2nd Cir. 1957); Johnson v. United States, 74 F.2d 703 (2nd Cir. 1935).
49. 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
50. Expert testimony indicated that the seaman might have survived for some
length of time due to favorable weather conditions. Such testimony also indicated that
if the seaman had fallen overboard shortly before it was determined that he was miss-
ing, and if a search had been subsequently commenced, there would have been a rea-
sonable chance of his rescue. Id. at 285.
51. Id. at 287 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
52. In similar circumstances in which a defendant has been negligent and the evi-
dence of the cause of the plaintiff's injury is more readily accessible to the defendant
than to the injured party, courts have placed the burden on the defendant to prove the
actual cause. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (where it could
not be determined which of two negligent defendants struck the plaintiff in the eye
and lip with bird shot, the burden was placed on each defendant to prove that the shot
which hit the plaintiff was that of the other defendant, rather than placing such a bur-
den on the innocent victim). See also Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d
465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970) (where a father and his five-year-old son drowned in the
defendant's pool). Because the defendant failed to follow the statutory requirement of
providing a lifeguard or posting a warning that no lifeguard was present, the court
One of the first cases to apply the Gardner rationale to a medical
malpractice situation was the leading case of Hicks v. United States.5 3
The court, in rejecting the defendant physician's argument that even
if surgery had been performed promptly on the condition which he
was accused of misdiagnosing, the success of such surgery would have
been mere speculation, held that:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated a
person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant's mouth to raise
conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond the possi-
bility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of survival and
the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it possible to
demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened in circum-
stances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass. The law does not in
the existing circumstances require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that the
patient would have lived had she been hospitalized and operated on
promptly.
5 4
Because the physician negligently nullified whatever chance of recov-
ery the defendant may have had, this negligence was held to be the
placed the burden of proof on the defendant's shoulders because such negligence "de-
prived the present plaintiffs of a means of definitively establishing the facts leading to
the drownings." Id. at 771, 478 P.2d at 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755. The court stated that:
[T]he shift of the burden of proof . . . may be said to rest on a policy judg-
ment that when there is a substantial probability that a defendant's negli-
gence was a cause of an accident, and when [this] negligence makes it
impossible, as a practical matter, for plaintiff to prove "proximate causation"
conclusively, it is more appropriate to hold the defendant liable than to deny
an innocent plaintiff recovery, unless the defendant can prove that his negli-
gence was not a cause of the injury.
Id. at 774 n.19, 478 P.2d at 476 n.19, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756 n.19 (emphasis in original).
53. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). This action was brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, alleging that the decedent's death from an intestinal obstruction and sub-
sequent strangulation of the bowel was the result of the defendant physician's failure
to diagnose and treat the condition.
54. Id. at 632 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Other pre-Hicks wrongful
death cases also held that the plaintiff does not have to prove survival to a certainty.
See Harvey v. Silber, 300 Mich. 510, 2 N.W.2d 483 (1942), in which the physician failed
to discover that a bullet had pierced the decedent's bowel in multiple locations, result-
ing in severe internal hemorrhaging and his subsequent death. Because a probability
existed that surgery would have saved his life and because the negligent diagnosis was
the proximate cause of the failure to operate, the court held that the negligent diagno-
sis was also the proximate cause of his death. Id. at 520, 2 N.W.2d at 487. See also
Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952), in which a seventy-
six-year-old man died of pneumonitis after being confined for eighteen hours in the
city jail withiout medical attention. The court held that the plaintiff need not elimi-
nate all other possible causes of death, but need only show facts from which defend-
ant's negligent causation could be reasonably inferred. The court also held, similar to
Hicks, that "one who has negligently forwarded a diseased condition and thereby has-
tened and prematurely caused death, cannot escape responsibility . . . ." Id. at 505,
104 N.E.2d at 876.
Cases following Hicks have also discarded a certainty of survival requirement. See
Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1974), affd on other grounds, 536
F.2d 594 (1976) (plaintiffs were not required to prove to a reasonable'degree of medical
certainty that decedent's life could have been saved; they need only show his "likeli-
hood" of survival); Carr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 821, 829 (W.D.
Ark. 1974) (plaintiff need not show to a mathematical certainty that the decedent
would have survived).
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proximate cause of her death.55
Although the decedent in Hicks would have more probably than
not survived had she been operated on promptly,56 the Hicks theory
was applied in a case where the decedent did not have a greater-than-
even chance of recovery in the absence of the physician's negligent
conduct. In Schuler v. Berger,57 a twenty-four-year-old woman had
experienced progressively severe abdominal pains and cramping. At-
tributing such pain to postpartum psychosis and a low pain threshold,
the physician failed to perform any diagnostic procedures or testing.
Shortly thereafter, the woman died from an acute rupture of the di-
verticulum of the sigmoid colon and subsequent peritonitis. Even
though the experts did not state to any degree of certainty that the
decedent would have survived if the physician had properly diag-
nosed her condition and promptly operated on her, the court applied
the Hicks rule and allowed the plaintiff to recover against the physi-
cian for the decedent's loss of a chance to survive.5 8
In a recent New Jersey medical malpractice case,59 the court ap-
55. Hicks, 368 F.2d at 633. The language in Hicks referring to the defendant's lia-
bility when he has destroyed a patient's chance of survival was reiterated in the Cali-
fornia medical malpractice case of Cullum v. Seifer, 1 Cal. App. 3d 20, 81 Cal. Rptr. 381
(1969). The Cullum court held that the defendant physician's delay in diagnosing and
treating the plaintiff's lymphosarcoma, even though no known cure was then available,
prevented more certain proof by the plaintiff that her cancer would have been cured
or arrested had treatment been started sooner. Id. at 26, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
See also Whitfield v. Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (1969),
where similar reasoning was applied. In that case, the decedent died as a result of the
allegedly negligent administration of anesthesia, causing the rupture of his stomach
secondary to gas insufflation. In following Hicks, the court held that in order for the
plaintiff to recover against a negligent physician for wrongful death, it was not neces-
sary to show to a certainty that the patient would have lived had the physician not
been negligent. Id. at 184' 169 S.E.2d at 568-69.
56. In Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984), the
court held Hicks inapplicable to the factual situation before it because the plaintiff in
Hicks had met the "more likely than not" test. However, it appears that the Gooding
court misinterpreted Hicks, since the language in Hicks indicated that decedent's loss
of a chance was the recompensed injury, not decedent's death. For a discussion of
Gooding, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
57. 275 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
58. See id. at 123-24. See also McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972),
where the decedent, who had had a recent history of chest pain, was allowed to return
home after being seen in the emergency room for severe chest pains. Shortly thereaf-
ter, he died. The court held that when the physician's negligent failure to treat a pa-
tient deprives him of a significant chance of improvement, the absence of certainty
that the treatment would have prevented the injury or death will not bar his recovery
against the physician. I& at 75. However, the court also held that the plaintiff must
show such treatment would have, with reasonable probability, prevented the injury or
death. Id.
59. Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (1984).
plied the Hicks rationale in addition to expressly acknowledging and
accepting a more flexible standard for medical malpractice claims
than that traditionally required in other tort actions.6 0 In that case,
the physician's seven-month delay in diagnosing his patient's breast
cancer caused her to have a markedly increased risk of cancer recur-
rence; subsequently, she suffered great mental and emotional dis-
tress. The court's rationale was that the relaxed standard in such a
case was necessary to avoid the harsh injustice of the stricter rule.61
In all of these cases, the physician's argument was that no proxi-
mate cause existed, because either irrevocable injury had already oc-
curred, or it would have occurred to his patient regardless of his
negligent acts or omissions.62 Such a contention, however, misstates
the appropriate test for proximate cause, which is that "[a] negligent
act need not be the sole cause of the injury complained of in order to
be a proximate cause of that injury." 63 Furthermore, the physician-
defendant's argument is a product of the same mistake made by the
majority of American courts-focusing on the death or debilitation,
rather than on the loss of a chance to survive or recover.
2. Application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a) and
the Substantial Factor Test
A second class of cases, somewhat different from the Hicks line of
cases, have also allowed recovery by a plaintiff who has been de-
prived of a less-than-even chance of survival due to a physician's neg-
ligence. These cases center around section 323(a) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertak-
ing, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm. .... 64
This Restatement theory has recently found much support in the
60. Id. at 413, 415, 471 A.2d at 413, 417. This is the same theory which the Cooper
court refused to apply. Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 251-52, 272 N.E.2d at 103. See supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
61. Evers, 95 N.J. at 413-19, 471 A.2d at 412-15. Thus, this court applied the ration-
ale acknowledged but rejected by the Cooper and Gooding courts. See supra notes 37-
40 and 44-45 and accompanying text.
62. This line of reasoning is similar to that utilized by defendant physicians in
wrongful birth cases when fetal injury had already occurred before the negligent acts
were committed. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (where
parents of rubella syndrome child brought wrongful birth action against hospital for
failure to inform the parents of the dangers to the fetus, where mother could have
otherwise obtained an abortion).
63. Id. at 477. "Moreover, the cause of action is not based on the injuries ... but
on defendant's failure to diagnose." Id.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a)(1965).
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Pennsylvania courts, which have extended it to medical malpractice
cases.
65
. The landmark medical malpractice case applying section 323(a) is
Hamil v. Bashline.66 In that case, the decedent arrived at the defend-
ant hospital's emergency room suffering from severe chest pains. Be-
cause the hospital lacked the appropriate equipment with which to
diagnose his condition, his wife took him to a physician's private of-
fice, where he died of a myocardial infarction.
Although the plaintiff failed to establish with a reasonable degree
of medical certainty that the hospital's negligence caused the dece-
dent's death, the court determined that the effect of section 323(a)
was to relax the degree of certainty normally required in other tort
actions.67 The court reasoned that the very nature of medical mal-
practice cases evades the preferred degree of certainty. This uncer-
tainty would completely protect a negligent physician from the
consequences of his conduct. 68 Thus, once the plaintiff has introduced
evidence that the defendant's negligence increased the risk of harm
to the patient, and that such harm was actually sustained, a determi-
nation as to what might have happened in the absence of the physi-
cian's negligence becomes a question for the jury. The jury will
weigh the probabilities in determining if the increased risk was a sub-
stantial factor in producing the injury.6 9
65. Pennsylvania is presently the leading jurisdiction allowing a plaintiff compen-
sation for the loss of a chance for recovery or survival. However, at least three other
states have followed Pennsylvania's lead in this area. See Thompson v. Sun City Com-
munity Hosp., Inc., No. 16634-PR (Ariz. June 12, 1984) (available Oct. 1, 1984, on
LEXIS, States library, Ariz. file) (whole-heartedly accepting and following the Re-
statement view where a physician's act increased the risk of harm to his patient); Ev-
ers, 95 N.J. at 416-17, 471 A.2d at 413-14 (accepting the Pennsylvania line of reasoning
and the Restatement view in allowing the plaintiff to submit evidence to the jury re-
garding her increased risk of developing recurrence of cancer due to physician's failure
to timely diagnose her breast cancer); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d
609, 614, 664 P.2d 474, 477 (1983) (refusing to allow a defendant who has put a chance
for life beyond realization to rely on the defense that the result would have happened
anyway).
66. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
67. Id. at 262-63, 392 A.2d at 1286-87.
68. Id. at 271, 392 A.2d at 1287.
69. Id. at 269-70, 392 A.2d at 1286-87. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 20.2, at 1113 (1956) (emphasis in original), which states:
[W]here it appears . . . that the victim might have saved himself by taking
advantage of a precaution which it has been shown defendant negligently
failed to afford, courts have generally let a jury find the failure caused the
harm, though it is often a pretty speculative matter whether the precaution
would in fact have saved the victim.
But see Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1019-20, where the court acknowledged Hami but criti-
Only two years later, in Gradel v. Inouye,70 the court again applied
the Restatement theory as introduced in Hamil. In this case, the
physician's failure to diagnose a fibrosarcoma in a seven-year-old boy
resulted in the amputation of the boy's left arm. The patient did not
show to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the physician's
failure to X-ray his arm caused his subsequent amputation, or that
the amputation would have been avoided absent such negligence.
The court held that the requisite standard of proof did not relate to
the fact that the physician caused the actual amputation; rather, the
focus was on whether his negligent conduct increased the risk of the
amputation.71 Therefore, it was the jury's responsibility to balance
the probabilities in deciding whether such negligence was a substan-
tial factor in bringing about the patient's injuries.72
In both of these cases the courts had the proper policy considera-
tions in mind-allowing an innocent aggrieved plaintiff to recover
from a culpable physician. However, even these courts did not fully
comprehend the key issue involved-the loss of a chance. Because of
this, they acknowledged that an increased risk of harm (or decreased
chance of avoiding harm) was a recoverable injury, but went about
allowing recovery in the wrong way.
Since, as previously discussed, there is no need to relax the requi-
site standard of proof for causation, the application of section 323(a)
of the Restatement is not necessary at all. The patient should be re-
quired only to show that "but for" the physician's negligence, he
would not have been deprived of his chance to survive or recover.
Furthermore, these courts have added an additional complicating ele-
ment-the "substantial factor" test, under which the patient must
still prove that the physician's negligence was a substantial factor in
causing his injury.
According to Prosser and Keeton, the "substantial factor" rule is
an improvement over the majority "but for" rule in that special class
of cases where multiple causation has played an important part in
producing the harm.73 In such cases, responsibility should be im-
cized such a relaxed causation requirement, believing this could also result in an injus-
tice to physicians, who could find themselves defending cases merely because a patient
failed to improve or because a disease was not arrested due to another course of action
having been pursued.
70. 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 674 (1980).
71. Id. at 544, 421 A.2d at 679.
72. Id. See also Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 494 Pa. 410, 417, 431 A.2d 920, 924
(1981) (expert testimony "need only demonstrate, with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that a defendant's conduct increased the risk of the harm actually sustained
.... ) (emphasis in original); Hoeke v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburg, 299 Pa. Super. 416-
17, 445 A.2d 140 (1982) (following the Hamil, Gradel, and Jones courts' application of
§ 323(a) of the Restatement, where physicians' operative and postoperative care alleg-
edly resulted in their patient's loss of her right leg and right kidney).
73. PROSSER, supra note 32, at § 41, 267.
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posed upon all causes of the harm, rather than absolving a culpable
defendant from liability merely because other causes have contrib-
uted to the result. Under this rule, no culpable defendant "can be ab-
solved from [his] responsibility upon the ground that the identical
harm would have occurred without [his negligence] . . .,74
Section 432 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also adopts this
line of reasoning for special cases.75 According to the Restatement,
the exception to the general rule that the defendant's negligent con-
duct is not a substantial factor in the resulting harm if such harm
would have occurred anyway, can be found in subsection (2) of sec-
tion 432, which states: "If two forces are actively operating, one be-
cause of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any
misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about
harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substan-
tial factor in bringing it about."7 6 Thus, where the harm has been
brought about by two or more concurrent causes, and the "but for"
test would fail, the plaintiff need only show that the defendant's neg-
ligence was a "substantial factor" in causing such harm.
In addition to its adoption in the recent Pennsylvania cases noted
above, this "substantial factor" rule has been adopted by various
other courts as the appropriate test for causation involving the medi-
cal mismanagement of a patient's condition.7 7 However, if the appli-
cation of this test to such cases is closely analyzed, one can plainly
see that this test does not work when the patient is alleging the loss
of a chance as his injury. In such a case, no concurrent causative
forces are at work in annihilating this chance to survive; rather, the
physician's negligent act or omission is the sole cause of this abro-
gated chance.
74. Id.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Bender v. Dingwerth, 425 F.2d 378, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1970) (where phy-
sician misdiagnosed decedent's angina as pulmonary congestion and decedent subse-
quently died of a myocardial infarction, plaintiff had only to prove that the defendant's
negligence was a proximate cause, rather than the sole cause, of his death); Robak, 658
F.2d at 477 ("A negligent act need not be the sole cause of the injury complained of in
order to be a proximate cause of that injury."); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 566
F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (in cases "involving the medical mismanagement of a pa-
tient's already potentially fatal condition," the "substantial factor" test is the appropri-
ate test for causation). See also Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316, 323-24 (W. Va.
1983), in which the court acknowledged that the "value of a chance" theory was valid,
even though disallowing plaintiff's requested jury instruction on this theory because
the instruction was confusing and argumentative. Unfortunately, this court also mixed
the concept of chance with that of "substantial factor."
Thus, while giving "lip service" to the right to recover for the loss
of a chance, the majority of these courts are still failing to analyze
the issue clearly. The application of the "substantial factor" test in
such cases is wrong, since the "but for" test remains applicable where
the lost chance is considered as the injury sustained.
IV. THE VALUE OF A CHANCE
A. Difficulties Encountered by the Jury
Valuation of the loss of a chance is the most difficult aspect of this
new concept. Because damage calculation is a jury duty, it is under-
standable that the court's focus of concern is upon the jury's ability
to deal with such a complex and intricate concept. Even though the
task is a difficult one, it is urged that juries are fully capable of valu-
ing a chance.
Juries today are faced with many complex cases involving unique
damages. For instance, the recent recognition of the new "wrongful
life" cause of action 78 has given the jury the task of compensating a
child suffering with birth defects subsequent to a physician's failure
to diagnose a disease or genetic condition during the prenatal stages.
Although it is difficult to measure the medical and financial burdens
to be endured by the family and the child in such a case, the courts
have allowed the plaintiffs to recover special damages, stating that
"[w]hile the law cannot remove the heartache or undo the harm, it
can afford some reasonable measure of compensation. . . ."79
These wrongful life cases have also addressed another issue which
has concerned courts considering whether to allow recovery for the
less-than-even chance-namely, the fear that the number of medical
malpractice claims will increase.8 0 As the courts in the wrongful life
cases have pointed out, a fear of increased litigation is groundless,
since before any recovery can be had, there first must exist a negli-
gent failure to act by one under the duty to do so.8 1
78. In 1980, the California Court of Appeal unanimously held that a cause of ac-
tion for "wrongful life" is valid. Curlender v. Bio-science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App.
3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
79. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348
(1982) (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 49, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (1967) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting)).
80. The "medical malpractice crisis" of the early 1970's brought about massive leg-
islative efforts in most states to decrease the number of such suits. See, e.g., the Medi-
cal Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), Stats. 1975, 2d Ex. Sess. 1975-
1976, chs. 1-2, 3949-4007 (codified as amended at CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West
1980)). See also American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Sara-
toga, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 379-83, 683 P.2d 670, 682-86, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683-86 (1984)
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing the purpose of the passage of MICRA in California).
81. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Moreover, regardless
of concern for increased litigation, it must be remembered that one wronged by negli-
gence is entitled to a remedy and should therefore be allowed his day in court.
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Another difficult area where the jury is required to calculate dam-
ages is that involving future damages to personal injury plaintiffs.
An increasing number of courts have recognized that "testimony con-
cerning possible future consequences of a plaintiff's present injuries
is admissible,"8 2 thereby allowing compensation for "increased sus-
ceptibility."8 3 Courts have allowed the jury to consider such evidence,
even where cumulative, on the basis that such testimony tends to
show the future consequences of an injury.8 4 In allowing such evi-
dence to go to the jury, courts give the jury the difficult burden of
weighing the evidence, in and of itself speculative, and awarding
82. Joseph, Less Than Certain Medical Testimony, 14 TRIAL, Jan. 1978, at 51 (em-
phasis added).
83. In such cases, many courts have even allowed "possibility" expert testimony,
treating such testimony as "medical fact." Id. at 52-53. See, e.g., Schwegel v. Goldberg,
209 Pa. Super. 280, 287, 228 A.2d 405, 408-09 (1967) (physiciim's explanation of possible
future effects of injury not deemed as speculation, but as a medical fact).
84. Joseph, supra note 82, at 54. See Trapp v. 4-10 Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d 1261, 1267
(8th Cir. 1970) (an expert may testify as to even a slight probability of a future risk of
injury); McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962) (3%-25% possi-
bility of becoming epileptic held admissible); Boose v. Digate, 107 Ill. App. 2d 418, 423,
246 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1969) (doctor's opinion as to plaintiff's future probabilities held ad-
missible); Melford v. Gaus and Brown Constr. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 497, 505, 151 N.E.2d
128, 131 (1958) (testimony that plaintiff had a "good chance" of eventual epileptic
seizures held admissible); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 314-15, 109 N.W.2d 828, 829-30
(1961) (possible relation between whiplash and headaches held admissible); Dornberg
v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 253 Minn. 52, 60, 91 N.W.2d 178, 185 (1958) (expert's testimony
that plaintiff might need future surgery was allowed to go to jury); Lynch v. Bissell, 99
N.H. 473, 476, 116 A.2d 121, 124 (1955) ("My opinion is that it will improve. When, God
only knows" held admissible); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 410, 517 P.2d
675, 679 (1973) (testimony of a mere possibility of developing meningitis secondary to a
skull fracture held admissible); Kuemmel v. Vradenburg, 239 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951) (testimony that injury was likely to have certain effects was sufficient
to give measure of certainty for damages). See also Comment, Expert Medical Testi-
mony in Personal Injury Cases in New England, 39 B.U.L. REV. 207, 215-16 (1959)
(opinion medical testimony that an act could or might cause a given physical result is
admissible). See generally Brachtenbach, Future Damages in Personal Injury Ac-
tions-The Standard of Proof, 3 GONZ. L. REv. 75 (1968); Colson & Orseck, Damages
for Possible Future Conditions, reprinted in DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND
WRONGFUL DEATH CASES at 334 (ed. S. Schreiber 1965); Rheingold, Future Damages,
29 NACCA L.J. 195 (1963); Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Damages for Increased Likelihood
of Illness and Disability, 1977 PERS. INJ. ANN. 313. Accord 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1976, at 186-87 (1978), which states:
This attempt to control the course of expert testimony [to include only the
certain or fairly probable] is of course unreasonable in itself....
This is only one of the many instances in which the subtle mental twistings
produced by the opinion rule have reduced this part of the law to a congeries
of nonsense which is comparable to the incantations of medieval sorcerers and
sullies the name of Reason in our law.
But see Jordan v. Bero, 158 W. Va. 28, 42, 210 S.E.2d 618, 629 (1974) (future conse-
quences must be shown with reasonable certainty).
damages accordingly. If juries are capable of adequately evaluating
this type of nebulous and speculative evidence and arriving at a fair
award of damages, surely they are also capable of dealing with evi-
dence relating to valuation of the loss of a chance.8 5
The application of complicated statistics to damage assessments is
routinely undertaken by juries in cases involving comparative negli-
gence.8 6 In such cases, the jury has been given the sensitive and
often complex assignment of giving a specific percentage figure to the
amount of negligence attributable to a culpable party. In spite of the
difficulties involved, the courts have not found them to be
insurmountable.8 7
Additionally, juries have been faced with such complicated compar-
ative negligence concepts as partial comparative indemnity among
concurrent tortfeasors.8 8 Principles of comparative fault have also
been applied to products liability cases, thus allowing courts to de-
crease a plaintiff's recovery to the extent that his own negligence
contributed to his injury.8 9 In these cases, the jury is faced with the
intricate burden of weighing the plaintiff's comparative fault (a negli-
gence concept) against a defective product, irrespective of the defend-
ant's fault.90
The recent concept of market share analysis introduced in Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories91 represents another modern theory of com-
parative fault which will require juries to engage in highly complex
85. Certainly, future damages are much more speculative than an injury which
has already occurred. Thus, compensating a plaintiff for a lost chance-a present and
existing injury-should clearly be allowed.
86. The doctrine of comparative negligence is very similar to the English "simple
probability" approach of apportioning damages. This concept allows liability for dam-
ages to be borne by those whose negligence caused the harm directly in proportion to
their respective fault. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (wherein the doctrine of contributory negligence was abandoned
and the doctrine of comparative negligence was adopted in California).
87. To assure that the jury has properly followed the specific guidelines it was
given for calculating damages, special verdicts and jury interrogatories have been uti-
lized. See, e.g., Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
88. This concept allows indemnity to be apportioned according to fault among
joint tortfeasors. Partial comparative indemnity was introduced in Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) and expanded in American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182
(1978).
89. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978).
90. The jury essentially is faced with reducing the plaintiff's damages by compar-
ing the plaintiff's culpability to the defendant's nonculpability. See id. at 763, 575 P.2d
at 1185, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Levine, Strict Products Li-
ability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DI-
EGO L. REv. 337, 356 (1977)) (who feels that this is "a feat which is beyond the prowess
of an American jury").
91. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
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valuation.92 This class action was brought by female children seeking
to recover damages for cancer of the vaginal and cervical areas which
had developed as a result of their mothers having ingested diethyl-
stilbesterol (DES), a synthetic estrogen compound administered for
the purpose of preventing miscarriages. Although the specific manu-
facturer of the DES which was administered to these mothers could
not be identified, the plaintiffs were allowed to recover against all of
the manufacturers of the drug upon showing that such manufactur-
ers produced a substantial percentage of the DES available. Each
manufacturer was then held liable for the proportion of the judg-
ment represented by its share of the drug market.93 Acknowledging
the difficulty in determining the market share with mathematical
certainty and apportioning damages among the multiple defendants
in relation to their fault, the Sindell court held that such reasons do
not militate against recovery. "[W]here a correct division of liability
cannot be made 'the trier of fact may make it the best it can.' "94 It is
significant to note that this is exactly what the Chaplin v. Hicks
court held over seventy years ago in the seminal case allowing a
cause of action for the loss of a chance. 95
As these cases indicate, the difficult task of balancing probabilities
and evaluating statistics, which often involves a high degree of specu-
lation, is a proper jury function. Therefore, the argument that the
valuation of a lost chance is too speculative should be discounted as a
bar to recovery.
B. The Speculative Nature of the Value of a Chance
Although valuing a lost chance is difficult, the calculation of its
value is not impossible and should be allowed. Recovery for a less-
than-even chance in medical malpractice cases has received increas-
ing approval by various courts over the years.96 As early as 1902, the
92. Although Sindell itself was not tried before a jury, it must be assumed that
juries in the future will indeed be required to deal with the concepts created by the
case.
93. Id at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. If the defendants could
prove that they could not have made the DES which caused the plaintiffs' injuries,
they could escape liability.
94. Id, at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (quoting Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948)). For an excellent discussion on mass exposure acci-
dents, such as those involving DES and asbestos, see generally Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97
HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984).
95. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
96. See O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971). An oral surgeon failed to
Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
[w]hen a physician undertakes to give his attention, care, and skill to a given
case of injury or disease, the patient is entitled to the chance for the better
results that are supposed to come from such treatment. . . . That the patient
might have died in spite of the treatment, or that "ordinarily" they die in such
cases ...is no excuse to the physician who neglects to give his patient the
benefit of the chance involved in a proper treatment of his case.9 7
This case supports the proposition that a chance for life or recovery,
no matter how minimal, has value.98
Recently, in James v. United States,9 9 the value of one's chance to
live was reiterated. In this case, the physician negligently failed to
inform his patient of a lung mass which was discovered during a rou-
tine chest X-ray. The patient did not discover the tumor until two
years later, at which time the cancer had already invaded the medias-
tinum. Although the plaintiff did not prove that the tumor was, in
fact, operable when it was first detected two years previously,100 he
demonstrated that early discovery and treatment would have given
him a chance of survival or prolonged life, of which he was wrong-
fully deprived.101 The court allowed him to recover damages, stating,
diagnose cancer when a tooth socket failed to heal properly after an extraction. Even
though this type of cancer only had an overall survival rate of 30%, the court allowed
the plaintiff to recover for his lost chance of survival, stating that "[a] patient is enti-
tled to as thorough and careful examination as his condition warrants and attending
circumstances will permit, with such diligence and methods of diagnosis as are usually
approved and practiced by physicians of ordinary skill and learning under like circum-
stances ...... Id at 1017 (citing Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 691, 140 N.W.2d
139, 143 (1966); Barnes v. Bovenmyer, 255 Iowa 220, 228, 122 N.W.2d 312, 316 (1963)).
See also Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff allowed to recover
from a physician who failed to diagnose a lymphosarcoma of decedent's throat, causing
decedent's chance of survival to decrease from 35% to 24% when the cancer was dis-
covered four months later); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357
N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974) (per curiam) (plaintiff allowed to recover for decedent's 20-40%
chance of survival of which she was deprived when an ordered hypotensive drug was
not administered, thereby resulting in a massive hemorrhage from her cerebral aneu-
rysm and her subsequent death before surgery could be performed).
97. Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 26, 69 S.W. 1096, 1098 (1902) (emphasis added). See
also Neal v. Welker, 426 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Ky. 1968) ("appellant would have had a case
warranting a trial if the availability of any medical testimony had been shown to sup-
port the contention that [he] had a chance--and that the chance had been obliterated
by inadequate treatment by any of the appellee-defendants"); Rogers v. Kee, 171 Mich.
551, 561, 137 N.W. 260, 265 (1912) ("a patient suffering from such an injury on calling a
physician is entitled to approved methods of treatment from which experience of the
profession indicates beneficial results are probable and to be anticipated; and, if not an
entire recovery, a better ultimate condition than if left to chance.").
98. But see Walden v. Jones, 439 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Ky. 1969) (where the court re-
fused to interpret Burk this way).
99. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
100. Cancer which has invaded the mediastinum is inoperable. Id. at 583. However,
testimony established that had the cancer been operable when it was first discovered,
the plaintiff would have had a 10-15% chance of survival for a five-year period. Id. at
585.
101. The court stated that "[aln individual may be compensated for any aggravation
of his injury or shortening of his lifespan proximately caused by the defendant's negli-
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"[n]o matter how small that chance may have been-and its magni-
tude cannot be ascertained-no one can say that the chance of pro-
longing one's life or decreasing suffering is valueless."'102
The policy reasons for allowing the plaintiff to recover for the loss
of a less-than-even chance of survival were discussed in Herskovits v.
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound.103 In that case, the physi-
cian failed to timely diagnose the decedent's lung cancer. When the
cancer was diagnosed six months later, the decedent's five-year
chance of survival had decreased from thirty-nine percent to twenty-
five percent. 0 4 The court held that the physician was liable for de-
priving the decedent of this chance, upholding the underlying policy
of not allowing one who put such a chance beyond realization to say
afterward that the result would have occurred anyway.105 "To decide
otherwise would be a blanket release from liability for doctors and
gence, even though other factors contributed to or caused the initial condition." Id. at
586 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 587. The courts have become increasingly more aware of the value of
one's life. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) ("wrongful birth"
case). In denying the parents the right to recover because a life exists, the court stated,
"we firmly believe the right of their child to live is greater than and precludes their
right not to endure emotional and financial injury." Id. at 13. The court went on to
say that "the value of a human life outweighs any 'damage' which might be said to fol-
low from the fact of birth, and recovery on any such thesis would violate ... public
policy. ... Id. at 13-14. Similarly, public policy advocates recognition of the value of
a chance to live. See generally Smith, Psychic Interest in Continuation of One's Own
Life: Legal Recognition and Protection, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1950) (discussing the
legally protectable interest in the continuation of one's life).
103. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). See the concurring opinion of Justice
Pearson, reviewing the various cases which have decided this issue and discussing the
policy considerations involved. Id. at 619-36, 664 P.2d at 479-87 (Pearson, J.,
concurring).
104. Id. at 612, 664 P.2d at 475. In addition to outwardly adopting the "loss of a
chance" theory, the opinion in Herskovits is consistent throughout in its reasoning,
providing perhaps the best available example of how and why a chance should be val-
ued. Referring to the decedent's reduction in chance from 39% to 25%, the court prop-
erly recognized that this was a 36% reduction in the decedent's chance of survival,
rather than making the common mistake of calculating this reduction as a 14% de-
crease (as did the medical expert in his testimony), which relates to the physician's de-
gree of causation of the actual death. Id. at 614, 644 P.2d at 476. To clarify this point,
consider this formula:
a -b 100 = % of loss of chance of survival where:
a = original chance of survival;
b = diminished chance of survival resulting from physician's failure to diagnose
promptly; thus:
39 -5= 1 X 100 = 35.9% loss of chance of survival.
39 39
105. Id.
hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of sur-
vival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence. 10
The major reason for the courts' reluctance to allow a patient to
recover for the loss of a less-than-even chance appears to be their
fear that juries may award damages which are too conjectural, specu-
lative, or remote.1 07 Rather than speculation, however, what is actu-
ally involved here is simply difficulty in ascertaining the "value" of a
"chance." This difficulty, however, is not a valid reason for denying
an injured patient the right to recover from a culpable physician. In
order to adhere to the fundamental principle that for every wrong
committed there should be a remedy, some degree of speculation is
necessary. The United States Supreme Court has commented that
"[iut is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation
and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or evidence is such
that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of
speculation and conjecture is required .... ,,108
Because a major reason for compensating a patient for the loss of a
chance of survival is to allow for a more just allocation of this loss,
the method of valuation utilized in calculating the value of such a
chance needs to be predictable.109 One author feels that a percentage
probability test is such a method.110
To better illustrate this method, reconsider the hypothetical previ-
ously propounded in the introduction and assume that the patient
died from his lung cancer. Regardless of whether the physician
caused his patient's ultimate death, he did cause his patient's loss of a
forty percent chance to recover and survive. Under the percentage
106. Id at 614, 664 P.2d at 477. See generally King, supra note 1; Wolfstone, supra
note 3.
107. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Damage is said tb be remote, when, although arising out of the cause of action,
it does not so immediately and necessarily flow from it, as that the offending
party can be made responsible for it .... The first, and in fact the only in-
quiry ... is whether the damage complained of is the natural and reasonable
result of the defendant's act; it will assume this character if it can be shown to
be such a consequence as, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from
the act....
Mortgage & Agreement Purchasing Co. v. Townsend, 56 D.L.R. 637 [1920], varying
[1920] 3 W.W.R. 7 (quoting J. MAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 33 (1856)).
108. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). See also James v. United States,
483 F. Supp. 581, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("damages may be recovered even if they are not
susceptible to accurate measurement."). This notion has been recognized in contract
cases, as well. See, e.g., Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 23 Cal. 2d 94,
102-03, 142 P.2d 741, 745 (1943) ("The courts are not so impotent that they will permit
a total loss of such a right merely because of a claimed uncertainty or difficulty in de-
termining the extent [of damages].").
109. See King, supra note 1, at 1382.
110. Id. Under this method, the compensable chance would be the percentage
probability by which the physician's negligent conduct diminished the likelihood of his
patient's survival. Id For an example of an equation using this method, see supra
note 104.
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probability test, the plaintiff's compensation for the loss of the dece-
dent's chance of recovery and survival would be forty percent of the
compensable value of the decedent's life had he survived.
The value placed on the decedent's life would involve the weighing
of several factors. These include his age, his family history, his per-
sonal habits, his occupation, his past health, his earning capacity, and
the survival rate for those suffering with this same condition."' The
forty percent calculation would then be applied to the figure repre-
senting the value of the decedent's life to arrive at the amount of the
plaintiff's compensation.11 2
Thus, difficulty in calculating damages cannot be a viable reason
for withholding recognition of the right to an unimpaired chance for
survival or for refusing compensation when this right has been
wrongfully impaired." 3 "Common-sense justice is, of course, the
most desirable objective inherent in the application of any legal con-
cept; and where the application of a legal concept so clearly results in
injustice, it is incumbent upon .the courts to examine the concept and
its applicability most carefully."14
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have traditionally denied a patient redress for the loss of a
111. Id.
112. Those courts which recognize one's right to recover for the loss of a chance
have also allowed a plaintiff to recover for the decedent's mental anguish resulting
from the awareness of the lost opportunity to survive. See James, 483 F. Supp. at 587.
See also Smith, supra note 102, at 803, which discusses three distinct items of damage
which may result from the wrongful shortening of one's life expectancy: mental
anguish resulting from the awareness that one's chance to survive has been dimin-
ished, reduction of prospective earnings, and loss of a future.
For an excellent and more thorough analysis on the percentage probability approach
in valuing a chance, see King, supra note 1, at 1381-87. See also Note, supra note 2, at
878-85. Both life and annuity tables can also be utilized in assessing the value of a
chance. See C. MCCORMICK & W. FRITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DAMAGEs 278 (2d
ed. 1952).
113. The fear that the jury will place too much emphasis on statistics or fail to un-
derstand how they were arrived at does not support a "blanket exclusion of statistical
data, however. Our court system is premised on confidence in the jury to understand
complex concepts .. " Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 639, 664 P.2d at 489. See also Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 16, at § 31 (the jury is capable of the complex tasks of comparing
data and assessing probabilities).
114. DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wash. 357, 366, 418 P.2d 1010, 1017 (1966). Accord
Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Use of Doubt and Reason, 58
Nw. U.L. REV. 750, 750 (1964) ("[a]ny judicial system involves continuing accommoda-
tion between the need to preserve a coherent set of ordering principles and the quest
for tolerable results in individual disputes").
chance for survival where the ultimate result would probably have
occurred due to his preexisting injury or disease in the absence of a
physician's negligent misdiagnosis or treatment. In cases where a
greater-than-even chance existed, the courts have in actuality found
the physician liable for causing the patient's death or debilitation,
rather than for reducing the patient's chance of survival or recovery.
Even those courts which have allowed a patient to recover for the
loss of a less-than-even chance have made the same mistake. By re-
laxing the long-adhered-to "but for" causation standard of proof,
these courts have held by implication that the damage sustained by
the patient was the actual loss of life or health, not the loss of a
chance.
Traditional causation principles need not be abandoned, however,
in order to allow redress to an innocent and aggrieved patient.
Rather, the courts should treat the loss of the chance as the true in-
jury suffered and value this chance accordingly.
In light of the rapid increase in medical knowledge and technology,
and with the increasing public awareness of disease prevention and
detection, the American courts should heed Benjamin Cardozo's
admonition:
There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the
rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the
conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in its origin it was the product
of institutions or conditions which have gained a new significance or develop-
ment with the progress of the years.1 1 5
PATRICIA L. ANDEL
115. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(quoting B. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 151 (1921)).
